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STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
Section 76-5-206(1) of the Utah Code which provides: 
Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the actor, 
acting with criminal negligence, causes the death of another. 
Utah Code Ann 76-2-103(4) 
With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect 
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his 
conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will 
occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the 
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
2 
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State v. Larsen (2000 Ut. App.) 999 P.2d 1252 13,16,18,19 
240 Am Jur 2d Section 74 18 
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Utah Code Ann. 76-5-206(1) 18 
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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
Authority for said appeal is found within the confine of Rule 26 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah State Constitution 
Article 1, Section 12; Utah Code Annotated Section 77-1 6(g); and 
Section 78-2-2 (i) Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
1. Does the defendant conduct amount to criminal 
negligence? Defendant argues that her conduct may 
be considered negligent civilly but does not amount to 
an indifference to human life. 
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2. Is the defendant's conduct the proximate cause of this 
fatal accident? Defendant argues that an independent 
cause produced the event without which the injury 
would not have happened. 
3. In the absence of defining this unidentified force, can the 
defendant be adjudged guilty for conduct that she 
ought to have foreseen. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This an appeal from the trial court's denial of the 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Arrest Judgment, and the 
Jury's conviction of negligent homicide. Defendant moved to 
dismiss the case based on the State's failure to meet their burden of 
proof. This was denied. Post-trial, the defendant via a Motoin to 
Arrest Judgment sought to correct this error of conviction—arguing 
that the evidence was lacking. This was also denied. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Summary of Facts 
Defendant was involved in a two car collision causing the 
death of a four year old child. The evidence most favorable to the 
State suggests the defendant to pass other motorist crossed into the 
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eastbound lane (a lawful maneuver). She then moved back into her 
westbound lane behind a dump truck. 
For an unknown and undetermined reason, her car came out of 
the westbound lane on its side, crossing into the eastbound lane and 
colliding with the car carrying the young victim. 
The reason for the car to turn on its side is undetermined. All 
acknowledge the presence of a force causing the car to lift and turn 
on its side but no one can determine the force. 
DETAILED FACTS 
This fatal accident occurred on September 17, 2003. The 
accident occurred just west of the intersection of SR 68 and SR 73. 
The intersection is west of Lehi, Utah. Page 13 Line 18. 
Two cars were involved, a Nissan Altima driven by the 
defendant and a Ford Crown Victoria, driven by Wendell Hathaway, 
the child's father. The first officer on the scene was Susan Morgan, 
Deputy Utah County Sheriff. No independent witnesses exist. Page 
22 Line 15. 
Deputy Morgan found Jacee Hathaway, a four year old female 
in a car seat with significant head trauma. Page 16. She had been in 
a car seat behind her father, Wendell Hathaway. Page 21. 
Ms Boss suffered a head injury and could not remember any 
significant details of the accident. Page 24 Line 12. Page 27 Line 23. 
Page 144 Line 22. Page 145 Line 4-10. 
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Deputy Sheriff Ray Edwards was the accident investigator. 
Page 21 Line 15. Page 37 Line 4-8. He collected the evidence. He 
interviewed the child's father, the mother and Ms. Boss. The father 
reported that all he could recall was they were going eastbound and 
a car came out on two wheels. Page 40 Line 18-21. He saw the car's 
undercarriage. 
Based on the information available, Edwards could not 
calculate the speed of either car. Page 43 Line 2. Page 50 Line 4-5. He 
testified of an intervening unknown force being present—a 
launching or lifting mechanism. This unknown force had caused the 
Boss car to turn onto its side and lose control. Page 52 Line 17. In the 
words of Deputy Edwards, "I don't know." Page 52 Line 22. 
He was not initially cognizant that the Nissan had turned on its 
side initially. He learned of this event post-investigation. As a result, 
his investigation did not attempt to locate this independent force 
Edwards concluded, from the information gathered, there was 
no degree of certainty about the cause of the accident. Page 52 Line 
25. He could only speculate about causation. There was no physical 
evidence present to draw that conclusion. Page 53 Line 15-20. 
Within three (3) days of the accident, the highway was 
reconstructed. Any opportunity to reconstruct the accident scene 
was lost. 
However, Edwards did conclude that there was no evidence 
suggesting she had left the road. Page 53 Line 23. No physical 
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evidence was located why the Nissan turn on its side. Page 56 Lines 
22-23/Page 57 Line 2-2. He knew that it did but the cause had been 
destroyed, removed, and remains unidentified. 
The child's father, Wendell Hathaway, testified. He advised 
that he and his wife saw a car passing two or more cars in their lane 
of travel as he was heading east. He slowed down and saw the car 
turn sharply into its own lane of travel. He saw a dump truck in front 
with the Nissan behind. As the dump truck passed (going west) 
them, he saw the underside of the Nissan coming out behind the 
dump truck. The Nissan hit the Ford. Page 69 Line 6-16. He does not 
recall any relevant distance when the Nissan moved back into the 
westbound lane. He, however, knew Boss had plenty of time to get 
back over. Page 74 Line 12-14. 
His testimony comported with Edwards. He did not see the 
Nissan leave the roadway nor strike any objects. Page 74 Line 15-20. 
He also remembered at least two cars were ahead of the Boss. 
Carrie Hathaway, the child's mother, testified. The mother 
remembers the Nissan coming over into their lane and hitting their 
car. Page 79 Line 18-22. Contrary to her husband, she did not see the 
Boss car passing others in the Hathaway's lane of travel. Page 82 Line 
17. She, however, did confirm that the Boss car pulled in behind a 
dump truck. Page 83. Line 10-13. She nor her husband could give any 
relevant time period for the Nissan getting into the westbound lane. 
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Page 83 Line 16-17. She, as her husband, did not see the Nissan go off 
the road. Page 84 Line 19-22. 
The State had subpoenaed two accident reconstructionist. The 
first accident reconstructionist called was Greg Duval. He advised 
that the Nissan Altima driven by Ms. Boss had a high degree of 
stability and would not roll over without this intervening force. Page 
103 Lines 9-13. This force had to exist. Page 118 Line 10-14. Page 104 
Line 1-2. 
Without this unidentified force, if the car was going to roll, its 
inertia would cause the car to roll onto the passenger side not the 
driver's. Without it, it would not reverse course and rotated onto the 
driver's side. 
However, the Nissan rolled onto the driver's side and then 
entered the eastbound lane. Page 103 Lines 23-25. This intervening 
force is still unknown. 
Duval speculated that if the car had hit a large rock on the road 
it might cause the car to lift. Yet, no rock was found by Edward. 
{However, Edwards' investigation did not pursue this line of inquiry. 
Edwards had not realized that the car had hit something causing it to roll 
during his initial investigation. Therefore, he did not try to locate this 
force.. Page 56 Line 13). Duval found the damage to the Nissan was 
not consistent with it hitting a rock. Page 104 Line 8-14. Page 104 Line 
8-11 
8 
Duval speculated that the car may have went off the roadway, 
off the paved surface, off the shoulder and out into the dirt and hit 
either a driveway ramp or something off the dirt shoulder that had 
enough angle for it to lift the car. Page 104 Lines 17-21. However, it is 
noted that he never made a physical examination of the paved 
surface, the paved shoulder, the dirt shoulder nor any object. His 
facts are limited by Deputy Edward's investigation. Page 114 Lines 22-
25. (This theory ran contrary to the information provided by Officer 
Edwards, Wendell Hathaway, and Carrie Hathaway — they did not see the 
car leave the roadway and no physical evidence that the Nissan left the 
roadway.) 
No physical evidence existed allowing Duval, as Edwards, to 
generate an opinion referencing the speed of the Boss vehicle. Page 
109 Line 14-15. No skid marks existed. No physical evidence existed 
indicating the car coming back onto the road from the shoulder. Page 
109 Line 22. Page 124 Lines 5-7. The lifting mechanism was not 
identified. Page 123 Lines 1-7/Page 108 Line 15/Page 109 Line 5-13. 
Duval found no evidence suggesting that the Boss vehicle had 
slid sideways. Page 118 Line 21-22. Page 119 Line 17. No evidence 
existed that the Boss car had either dirt, gravel, or grass to its right 
side. Page 123 Line 23-25. 
The prosecution admitted the presence of this intervening 
event—the outside force. The State focused on Ms. Boss's conduct 
preceding her encounter with this unknown force. (Page 125 Line 18-
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20). He asked if Ms Boss would have encountered this outside force if 
she had not been negligent. Duval asserted that Boss had been 
negligent in the events preceding her contact with this unknown 
force. Page 125 Line 21. No judgment was made after contact with 
unknown force. 
The State rested. 
The defense then called Dennis Andrews. Mr. Andrews had 
been subpoenaed by the State as their witness. Andrews is also an 
accident reconstructionist. Andrews found that no pre-impact speed 
calculations could be made. Any attempt to calculate actual speeds 
was not plausible. Page 134 Lines 9-14. 
He concluded that this outside force had to exist. The 
identification of this force was limited by the investigation. Since it 
was not found, the force could not be analyzed. Page 134 Lines 21-25. 
Andrews also concluded that no evidence suggesting the Boss car 
had moved sideways. Page 135 Lines 3-5. Andrews could not to 
determine why the car rolled onto the driver's side. Page 135 Lines 14-
16. 
He concluded: 
The event leading to the rollover of the Boss vehicle cannot 
be determined from the data collected at the scene. 
Witnesses to the collision and events prior to that collision 
did not remain at the scene to provide the information 
needed to determine what event caused the loss of control 
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by the Boss vehicle before it entered the Hathaway's lane. 
Page 135 Line 25 to Page 136 Line 6. 
Under questioning by the State, Andrews acknowledge this 
outside force was a factor in causing the accident. Page 139 Line 8. 
The investigation limited his ability to determine the force or object. 
As with Duval, the prosecution asked Andrews if Ms. Boss 
would have encountered this outside force unless she had been 
negligent. He responded: 
I don't because I don't know what the force is. I don't 
know what the object is, so I can't relate negligence to that 
object. Page 140 Line 8-10. Also at page 141 Line 21. 
After the close of the State's case, the defendant sought a 
dismissal of the cause arguing that the State had not met its burden 
of proof. This was denied. The Jury returned a guilty verdict. 
The defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment based on the 
same arguments contained herein. This was also denied. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under a Negligent Homicide conviction, a person may be 
found criminally negligent with respect to circumstances 
surrounding her conduct or the result of her conduct when: 
l i 
1. She ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur; 
and 
2. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the 
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in 
all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
The 'negligence' required in a criminal case must be more than 
the lack of ordinary care and precaution as demonstrated here; it 
must be more than inadvertence or a misadventure, but rather a 
recklessness or indifference incompatible with a proper regard for 
human life. 
The State's evidence suggested that Ms. Boss passed two or 
more cars and sharply moved back into her own lane of travel. This 
does not rise to the level of a criminal negligent standard— 
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recklessness or indifference incompatible with a proper regard for 
human life. 
Further, no accident would have occurred except for this 
intervening force. This intervening force is unknown. In the absence 
of determining this force, we cannot conclude that her conduct was a 
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise. We first have to identify this unknown object before 
we can declare her conduct to be a gross deviation of an ordinary 
person's standard of car. 
ARGUMENT 
In State v. Larsen (2000 Ut. App.) 999 P.2d 1252, the defendant 
was driving a green Ford Ranger, traveling northbound on Wasatch 
Boulevard in Salt Lake City. He approached the intersection of 
Wasatch Boulevard and 3800 South. He pulled into the left-hand turn 
lane, preparing to make a westbound turn onto 3800 South. 
Defendant stopped for a red light at the intersection. A witness, J. 
Henry Larsen (not related), was also preparing to make a left turn 
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from Wasatch Boulevard onto 3800 South. He was stopped behind 
defendant Larsen. After the light turned green, defendant waited a 
few moments and began to turn through the intersection. At the 
same time, Douglas King was driving a blue Subaru Legacy, 
traveling southbound on Wasatch Boulevard. There were three 
passengers in King's car, including Kara Shinners-Little. 
As King approached the intersection at Wasatch Boulevard 
and 3800 South, his car traveled over a small hill in the road, 
approximately 200 yards north of the intersection. Near the top of the 
hill, Wasatch Boulevard splits into two lanes. As the road split, King 
moved into the right lane to pass a slower moving car. King did not 
look at the speedometer but believed he was traveling between forty 
and forty-five miles per hour. King became aware of defendant's 
truck moving across the intersection a split second before the two 
vehicles collided. 
J. Henry Larsen testified that defendant was making the left 
turn at a normal rate of speed, between ten and fifteen miles per 
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hour. He also testified that the Subaru was traveling at a "normal" 
rate of speed for Wasatch Boulevard, estimating its speed at forty-
five to fifty-five miles per hour. As Larsen saw the two cars moving 
closer together, he honked his horn as a warning to defendant. 
Larsen then watched the Subaru hit the Ford Ranger on its passenger 
side, pushing the truck backwards and sideways. Larsen told his 
passenger to call 911 and went to see if he could help the occupants 
of the vehicles. 
Everyone involved in the collision was injured. Although all 
four of the occupants of the Subaru were injured, only Shinners-Little 
was rendered unconscious. Shinners-Little later died as a result of the 
collision. 
At the time of the accident, the weather was dry and it was 
dusk but still light outside. Larsen could not tell if defendant's truck 
had its lights on. King did not think that defendant's truck had its 
lights on and indicated that if the turn signal was on it was between 
blinks when he saw the truck. King also could not remember if he 
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had his lights on. Neither driver slowed down or swerved to avoid 
the accident. The truck's tires made yaw marks on the road, 
indicating that the tires were turning as the collision occurred. 
Defendant was nineteen years old at the time of the accident. 
As the officers who arrived at the scene were clearing the 
intersection, Deputy Clinton Johnson found a previously opened 
bottle of Canadian Host Whiskey in defendant's truck. After finding 
the alcohol, Deputy Johnson had defendant's blood drawn to test for 
the presence of alcohol. Tests of defendant's blood revealed that his 
blood alcohol level was .009 percent, less than .01 percent. At the 
conclusion of the trial, the trial court found defendant guilty of each 
charge but this Court overturned the conviction. 
The Court analysis turned on the Court's interpretation of: 
1) Section 76-5-206(1) of the Utah Code which provides: 
"Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the 
actor, acting with criminal negligence, causes the death of 
another."; and 
2) Utah Code Ann 76-2-103 (4) defining criminal negligence 
as when he ought to be aware of a substantial and 
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unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result 
will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree 
that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would 
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
The Court found that conduct is not criminally negligent 
unless it constitutes a "v gross deviation' from the standard of care 
exercised by an ordinary person." 
Ordinary negligence, which is the basis for a civil action for 
damages, is not sufficient to constitute criminal negligence." M In 
State v. Warden, 784 P.2d 1204 (Utah Ct.App. 1989), this court 
explained, " ^[m]ere inattention or mistake in judgment resulting 
even in death of another is not criminal unless the quality of the act 
makes it so.'" 
It must be something more than mere inadvertence or 
misadventure, but rather a recklessness or indifference incompatible 
with a proper regard for human life 
The Court found the defendant's conduct is more accurately 
characterized as a serious mistake in judgment. His conduct was not 
undertaken recklessly or with an indifference to human life, nor does 
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the quality of defendant's act lead to the conclusion that his actions 
were criminal. 
Larsen's failure to see an oncoming car which was visible to 
other drivers as he made a left turn is equated to Ms. Boss's conduct. 
She had completed the passing of two or more cars and had moved 
back into her lane of travel. At best, it is a serious mistake of 
judgment but does not represent an indifferent to human life. 
Further, this tragic accident does not occur in the absence of 
this unknown force. 
C A U S A T I O N 
PROXIMATE CAUSE 
The State had the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Ms. Boss's conduct was the proximate cause of the accident. 
State v. Larsen, supra. See also 240 Am Jur 2d Section 74. The 
evidence here was based on speculation and conjecture relating to 
the cause of the accident. 
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The evidence suggested that an independent force—a lifting 
mechanism— caused the Boss car to lift, roll onto its side, and cross 
the lane into the Hathaway car. 
Ms. Boss' conduct alone does not cause this accident. The 
independent and unknown force is required for this accident to 
occur. Her conduct may be a contributing factor but not the 
proximate cause of death. 
In State v. Larsen, supra, the Court stated: 
The State fails to show any causal connection between the collision 
and the alcohol, unlit headlights, or defendant's failure to activate 
his turn signal... Because there is no nexus between the collision 
and the presence of alcohol, the absence of headlights, or inactivated 
turn signal, these facts do not support the trial courVs 
determination that defendant was criminally negligent.... 
This unknown lifting force is the cause for the car's loss of 
control. The State failed to define this lifting mechanism prohibits 
any analysis as to what portion of fault should be assigned to Ms. 




40 Am Jur 2nd-Homicide-Section 17 states: 
If it appears that the act of the accused was not the proximate 
cause of the death for which he is being prosecuted, but that 
another cause intervened, with which he was in no way 
connected, and but for which death would not have occurred, 
such supervening cause is a good defense to the charge of 
homicide. 
In State v. McAllister, 60 Wash. App. 654 806 P.2d 772(1991), 
the Washington Court defined proximate cause: 
Proximate cause is defined as "a cause which in direct 
sequence, unbroken by any new, independent cause, produces 
the event complained of and without which the injury would 
not have happened." State v. Gantt, 38 Wn. App. 357, 359, 684 
P.2d 1385 (1984). . . . Evidence of a superseding negligence 
may be material to whether the defendant's negligence was a 
proximate cause of the death or whether the defendant was 
negligent at all. 
There, defendant's wife, Nancy, and her 27-year-old 
daughter, Garnett Shelly, drove Mrs. McAllister's 1966 Volkswagen 
van to Ernie's Tavern. Mrs. McAllister was the last person to close the 
van's side doors. Because the van was old, the side doors were 
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difficult to secure; however, the McAllisters had not had any trouble 
with the doors opening. Mrs. McAllister phoned defendant and 
asked him to meet at a local tavern. While there, the McAllisters 
drank beer. Ms. Shelly drank several wine coolers. Upon leaving the 
tavern, Mr. McAllister climbed into the driver's side. Ms. Shelly 
entered the van through the passenger door. Ms. Shelly crawled over 
the front seat and entered the back of the van. 
As Mr. McAllister was driving home, he remembered he left 
his jacket at the Tavern. He turned left into a warehouse parking lot 
on the opposite side of the street in order to reverse the van's 
direction of travel, return to the tavern, and retrieve the 
jacket. After completing the turn, Mr. McAllister noticed the side 
doors of the van were open, and some restaurant grates, which 
were kept in the back of the van, had fallen out. He stopped the 
van and proceeded to enter the road to retrieve the grates, 
whereupon he discovered Ms. Shelly had fallen out of the van 
through the side doors and had hit her head on the road. Ms. 
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Shelly died shortly thereafter. The autopsy indicated she died as 
a result of a blow to the back of her head. 
Post trial, the defendant motioned the Court to arrest 
judgment as here. It was denied. The Appellate Court reversed 
finding defendant's conduct not the proximate cause of Shelly's 
death. The Court stated: 
Wlten the independent intervening act of a third person was one 
which was not incumbent upon the defendant to have anticipated 
as reasonably likely to happen, then there is a break in the causal 
connection between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiffs 
injury. 
To support this present conviction, Ms. Boss would have had 
to anticipate as likely this unidentified force or mechanism. If we 
cannot define the force, how can we expect her to do so? 
'Criminal negligence' contemplates the lack of such intervening 
forces. For the conviction to stand, we must conclude that she failed 
to perceive an identified source and her failure to do so constituted a 
gross deviation from that imagine ordinary person's conduct. 
The lifting mechanism has to be presence, but we are left to 
speculate as to what it is and why or how it could have caused the 
Boss vehicle to lift, rolled, and go into oncoming traffic. 
A conviction cannot rest on speculation. 
SPECULATION AS TO THE EVENTS 
In Ayers v. State, 247 Ark. 174,444 S.W.2d 695 (1969) the 
Arkansas Supreme Court found that where circumstantial evidence 
alone is relied upon to establish guilt, such evidence must exclude 
every other reasonable hypothesis of guilt. 
The facts there, are in part, similarity to this present case. 
Ayers had been driving his car and it collided with the car driven by 
a Beckwith. The record was not clear as to the exact cause of the 
accident. No one testified as an eyewitness to the collision. The only 
evidence that either car was being driven in wanton disregard for 
others was circumstantial. They were able to make a determination 
of the point of impact being across the line by two feet. But they 
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were unable to determine which car was traveling which way and 
which one was in the proper lane of travel. 
When the evidence was unable to identify which car was in 
which lane, the Court concluded that the conviction could not rest on 
speculation or conjecture. The State failed to meets its burden of 
proving the death was the proximate result of the defendant driving. 
Here, we have a car that was driving west and pulls in behind 
the truck. According to Mr. Hathaway, the car is behind the truck for 
approximately 3 seconds and then comes out for some unknown 
reason. The Boss car is on its side and at that point uncontrollable. 
As in Ayers, we are left to speculate why the car turned on its side. 
No eyewitnesses exist. Why the car was lifted on its side is not 
known. At best, it is based on conjecture and speculation. We only 
know that there had to be a lifting mechanism present. 
Lacking the ability to determine this force, we cannot hold 




The State had to prove that she ought to have been aware of 
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances existed or the 
result will occur. Utah Code Ann 76-2-103(4). This risk must be of 
such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constituted a 
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
How can we charge her with that responsibility that she should 
have been aware of this triggering and lifting mechanism when we 
can't? Unless we know what the mechanism is, we cannot say that 
she ought to have been aware. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conduct was not the proximate cause of the 
accident. An independent and intervening cause produced this 
event. This accident does not have happened without this lifting 
mechanism. This death would not have occurred but for this force. 
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mechanism. Without this force, the Boss car does not roll and does 
not cross over into oncoming traffic. 
To sustain this conviction, the statute mandates that the 
defendant should have been aware of this unknown and unidentified 
object. Absence the identification of this object, a comparison cannot 
be made referencing her conduct or the lack thereof in relation to the 
object. For without this object's presence, the accident does not 
occur. 
The conduct assigned to Ms. Boss of passing two cars and 
making sharp turn into her lane of travel does not rise to the level of 
criminal negligence. It may have been a serious misjudgment or 
error, but it does not rise to a level of indifference to human life. 
Dated this 24th day of February, 2005. 
SHI 
Attorney for Appelant 
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